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Abstract—This paper proposes an efficient approach of secure 
clustering in distributed sensor networks. The clusters or groups 
in the network are formed based on offline rank assignment and 
predistribution of secret keys. Our approach uses the concept of 
weakly connected dominating set (WCDS) to reduce the number 
of cluster-heads in the network. The formation of clusters in the 
network is secured as the secret keys are distributed and used in 
an efficient way to resist the inclusion of any hostile entity in the 
clusters. Along with the description of our approach, we present 
an analysis and comparison of our approach with other schemes. 
We also mention the limitations of our approach considering the 
practical implementation of the sensor networks. 
 
Index Terms—Cluster, DSN, Offline, Rank, WCDS 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE types of services expected from Wireless Sensor 
Networks demand the inclusion of security for the 
trustworthiness of the reported data. While the routing of data 
and information throughout the network should include some 
sorts of security mechanisms, the initial formation of the 
network should also be secured to elude any harmful attempts 
by the potential adversaries. Hence, it is necessary to ensure 
security from the very beginning-state of the network’s 
operation. This is more applicable for Distributed Sensor 
Networks as these are envisaged to operate in the presence of 
adverse or enemy units. A Distributed Sensor Network (DSN) 
is basically a wireless sensor network with a large number of 
sensors and large coverage area. It differs from the traditional 
wireless sensor network in the sense that, it contains 
considerably huge number of sensors which are intended to be 
deployed over hostile and hazardous areas where the 
communications among the sensors could be monitored, the 
sensors are under constant threat of being captured by the 
enemy or manipulated by the adversaries. DSN is dynamic in 
nature in the sense that, new sensors could be added or deleted 
whenever necessary [1]. These types of networks are suitable 
for covering large areas for monitoring, target tracking, 
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surveillance and moving object detection which are very 
crucial tasks in many military and public-oriented operations. 
In this paper, we propose an efficient approach for key-
predistribution among the sensors which helps for offline rank 
assignments of the sensors and eventually plays the crucial 
role to form a network-wide weakly connected dominating 
set. Our target is to ensure security and to minimize the 
number of cluster heads while forming the clusters in the 
network, so that a relatively small set of cluster heads can 
securely cover the whole network. We assume that, the base 
station is fully secure and the adversary cannot affect the base 
station in any way. The scope of this paper is restricted to the 
secure clustering of the distributed sensor networks. Our later 
analysis and simulation show that, our approach could 
perform well to form secure clusters in a distributed sensor 
network with a minimum number of cluster heads.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II 
outlines the related works, Section III presents our model, 
Section IV proposes our approach and the method for key-
predistribution, Section V contains the performance analysis 
and comparison, and Section VI concludes the paper.  
 
II. RELATED WORKS 
A cluster is a subset of the total set of sensors in a network 
which might have at least one cluster head capable of 
manipulating sensed data locally and then sending the gist of 
that to the base station. Grouping nodes into clusters is a good 
idea as it helps to divide the network into several separate but 
interrelated regions. It also helps for efficient routing within 
the network. Some of the previous works addressed the issue 
of clustering or group formation in sensor networks. Most of 
the previous works on clustering of wireless sensor networks 
do not address the security issues or consider secure 
environment for the bootstrapping of the whole network. We 
argue that, this is in most of the cases might not be possible. 
For example, if sensor networks are profoundly used in the 
military reconnaissance scenario, both sides might have the 
technology and while forming the friendly network there 
could be a hidden and active enemy-sensor network. If the 
friendly network is to be formed later than the enemy network 
in a particular area, the hostile sensors might actively try to be 
included in the clustering process or could try to hinder the 
formation of any other network within the region. Here we 
mention some of the works related to the clustering in wireless 
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 sensor networks. [2] presents a distributed expectation-
maximization (EM) algorithm suitable for clustering and 
density estimation in sensor networks. Energy-Aware 
clustering is addressed in [3], [4], [5], [6], [7] etc. In [17] the 
authors propose a load-balanced clustering scheme which 
increases the lifetime of the network. Other works on 
clustering in sensor networks are [8], [9], [10] etc. 
Though we focus on the clustering or formation of the 
sensor network, our work differs from all of the above as we 
model our network to form the groups based on offline rank 
assignments by pre-distribution of keys and using the notion 
of weakly connected dominating set considering the whole 
distributed sensor network as a graph. The details of key 
generation and selection, prevention of DoS attack caused by 
jamming [16] and after-formation secure data transmissions 
are beyond the scope of this paper and will be presented in our 
future publications.  
 
III. OUR MODEL 
We consider the topology of the whole distributed sensor 
network as a unit-disk graph (UDG) [11], G = (V,E), where V 
is the set of sensors (vertices) in the network and E is the set 
of direct communication links (edges) between any two 
sensors.  
                          
Fig. 1.  (Left) Legend used in the paper (Right) Unit-disk Graph 
 
Definition 1. A dominating set S is a subset of the vertex 
set V of a graph G =(V,E) (i.e., VS ⊆ ), so that all other 
vertices in the graph are adjacent to the vertices of S. For a 
dominating set S, NG[S]=V, where NG[S] is the set of vertices 
including the vertices in S and the vertices adjacent to a vertex 
of S (Figure 2). However, finding a minimum size dominating 
set in a general graph is NP-complete [12].  
Definition 2. A connected dominating set (CDS), SC is a 
dominating set of a given graph G=(V,E) where the induced 
subgraph of SC is connected. Figure 3 shows the connected 
dominating set for our graph model (i.e., all the black 
vertices). 
The connected dominating set for any type of ad hoc 
network could be used for efficient routing or message 
transmission throughout the network. However, for CDS, a 
large number of dominating nodes is needed to maintain the 
connectivity requirements of the network. 
Definition 3. A weakly connected dominating set (WCDS), 
SW is a dominating set where the graph induced by the stars of 
the vertices in SW is connected. A star of a vertex is comprised 
of the vertex itself and all the vertices adjacent to it (All the 
black nodes in Figure 4). For any given graph, 
                                CDSWCDS ≤                               (1) 
where, |.| denotes the size of the set. So, in case of WCDS, less 
number of dominating nodes is needed for establishing 
network-wide connectivity than that is required for CDS. For 
example, in Figure 3, CDS =13 while in Figure 4, 
WCDS =8 for the same network size and structure. 
 
Fig. 2.  Dominating Set consisting of black vertices 
  
Fig. 3.  Connected Dominating Set 
 
Fig. 4.  Weakly Connected Dominating Set 
    
Fig. 5.  Dominators’ coverage areas in WCDS 
 
The weakly connected dominating set underpins our 
proposed scheme. In fact, it is easy to see that each 
dominating node (or vertex) in the weakly connected 
dominating set is at the center of a star (or, disk). Thus for 
each dominating node in a WCDS of the overall network, we 
have one star where all the other nodes in the star are just one 
hop apart (Figure 5). Also it could be observed that, between 
two stars there is at least one common dominated node which 
could be used for the communication purpose between two 
separate stars. We term this common dominated node between 
two individual stars as ‘Mediator’ (Figure 6). 
  
Fig. 6.  Mediator between two groups/stars 
 
IV. OUR APPROACH 
We apply two stage operations for secure formation of 
clusters in the network. 
Assumption 1. Once the sensors are deployed they remain 
relatively static in their respective positions. 
Assumption 2. In a unit disk or transmission range of a 
sensor, all the neighboring sensors do not necessarily have a 
direct communication link among themselves. If two nodes i 
and j have a direct communication link, it is 
bidirectional; EijEjiji ∈⇒∈∀ ),(),(,,  and it exists if 
and only if i and j have common secret keys. 
 
Fig. 7.  Ranking of the sensors based on the key pre-distribution 
 
A. Offline Rank Assignment 
The sensors in the network are assigned their ranks based 
on the offline key-distribution. We divide the whole set of 
sensors V into two subsets, V1 and V2, where V1 contains the 
probable group dominators (GD or cluster heads) and V2 
consists of ordinary sensors (Os). The set V2 is further divided 
into several subsets wi ⊂  V2, i=1, 2, 3,….,N and N is the 
maximum number of possible proper subsets of V2. Each wi is 
assigned to one element in the set V1. The sensors in the subset 
wi (Os1, Os2,….Osη) and corresponding one sensor from V1 
(let, GDi, i=1) are taken for group-wise key-predistribution 
(Figure 7). All the sensors in the set wi are assigned two keys: 
group key and individual key. The group key is common for 
all the Oss in a wi but the individual key is shared by the 
particular sensor and the GDi. The GDi contains all the 
individual keys of the sensors in its wi and its own group key. 
Assumption 3. All the sensors have same transmission 
range. Each node transmits within the transmission range 
isotropically (in all directions) so that each message sent is a 
local broadcast. 
Assumption 4. The Base Station (BS) contains all the 
individual keys and group keys of the network. 
Assumption 5. The number of Oss (value of η) in each 
group is decided on demand. It could be group specific or set 
to a common value for all the groups. η is actually the 
maximum degree (Δ(GDi)) of a GD in a group. 
B. Secure Cluster Formation 
The groups of sensors are deployed over the target region 
one group at a time. After deployment, each Os tries to find 
out its own GD by sending a join request packet encrypted 
with its individual key. The corresponding GD in turn sends 
the join approval message encrypted with the group key. In 
both cases, both the GD and the Os can decrypt the messages 
and form the group. In some cases, the corresponding GD of 
an Os might not be within one-hop transmission range (disk). 
In this case, the Os detects the presence of other GDs of other 
groups in its surroundings, collects their ids and sends an error 
message to the base station (BS) with this information. The 
GDs within its one-hop transmission range also could detect 
such erroneous Os and reports to the BS. The BS in turn 
assigns one of the neighboring GD as the adopter of the 
orphan Os. In the worst case, the Os might not find any GD in 
its surroundings. In this case, The BS assigns the rank of a GD 
(let us call it GDos) to that particular Os though it does not 
contain any other sub-ordinate sensors. An Os which gets its 
own GD and another GD of another group in its transmission 
range is the mediator in this case. As stated earlier, all the 
stars thus shaped could use mediators for the inter-group 
(inter-star or inter-cluster) communication (see Figure 6). In 
this way, eventually the resultant logical model of the whole 
network contains a weakly connected dominating set where 
the GDs of the logical groups (stars) are the dominating nodes 
and all other nodes in the network are dominated. This logical 
model now could be used for secure message delivery within 
the network (using the secret keys).The pseudo code for 
secure cluster (group) formation algorithm is presented in 
Figure 8. 
 
Let, 
enci(.) - message encrypted by individual key of i 
enciNOT(.) - message encrypted by an unknown 
individual key  
encG(.) - message encrypted by the group key 
encGNOT(.) - message encrypted by an unknown group key  
Osg - set of Oss allowed under a group dominator g 
locbr(.) - local broadcast within one hop 
transmission range 
 
for each s∈VOs 
locbr(enci(JOIN_REQ)) 
 if encG(JOIN_APRV) from any g∈VGD and hop(s,g)=1 
  edge(s,g) 
  dominator(s)Åg 
 else 
  flood(enci(GD_ERR)) destined to BS 
 end if 
 if encGNOT(JOIN_APRV) from any g∈VGD and hop(s,g)=1 
  neighbor_dominator(s)Åg 
 end if 
   
for each g∈VGD 
 if enci(JOIN_REQ) from any s∈VOs and s∈Osg 
  send encG(JOIN_APRV) 
 edge(s,g) 
sub-ordinate(g)Ås 
end if 
 if enciNOT(JOIN_REQ) from any s∈VOs 
  mediator(g)Ås 
end if 
if enci(GD_ERR) from any s∈VOs and hop(s,g)=1 
  report encG(ORP_ERR) to BS 
 end if 
#In case of the BS: 
if enci(GD_ERR) from any s∈VOs and encG(ORP_ERR) 
from any g∈VGD  
if same id of s, issue command: Adopter_GD(s)Åg 
 
Fig. 8.  Pseudo Code for Secure Clustering Algorithm 
 
All the groups of sensors could be deployed at a time or 
more groups could be deployed later based on demand. If it is 
needed, some sensors in a group could be deployed later. 
During the offline key pre-distribution, all the nodes are 
assigned the keys but all the nodes might not be deployed. 
When any of those remaining nodes is newly deployed, it 
follows the procedure of joining a group. If authorized by the 
access list of GD, it joins the group. Otherwise, GD forwards 
the id of this sensor to BS. BS informs GD about the 
individual key of that Os if it is a legitimate node. If 
authenticated by BS, GD generates a new group key and 
encrypts the new group key with the newly added node’s 
individual key and sends it to that particular Os. All other 
nodes in the group know about the change of group key by a 
local broadcast by the GD of that group. In this case, the 
previous group key is used for encrypting the new group key. 
For leaving a group or cluster, the node simply leaves a 
message to inform the GD which in turn generates a new 
group key and multicasts it within the group members. 
 
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON 
We form a WCDS to cover almost all of the nodes in the 
network with minimum effort. The offline rank assignment 
reduces the burden of executing resource-hungry operations to 
form clusters like other clustering mechanisms. As shown in 
equation (1), WCDS requires less number (or equal to) of 
dominating nodes to cover the whole network than that of a 
CDS requires. Depending on the requirements we can increase 
or decrease the value of η (the expected degree of a GD in a 
group). In ideal case, the size of the dominating set created in 
our approach could be obtained by, 
 
1
Graph in the  verticesofNumber Set Dominating of Size += η
 
                               
1)(
Graph in the  verticesofNumber 
+Δ= GD
      (2) 
In our experiment, we generate random graphs of 20-200 
and 40-200 nodes with expected average degree 6 and 12 
respectively. To simulate the structure of the sensor network, 
we place the vertices randomly over a 2-D rectangular plane. 
The network size and density is set by changing the number of 
vertices and transmission ranges of the nodes. Applying our 
approach and two algorithms (I and II) of [13] we find that 
our approach generates much smaller number of group 
dominators or cluster heads. For a large number of sensors it 
works effectively. Figure 11 shows the size of dominating sets 
in comparison with that of Algorithm I and Algorithm II of 
[13]. The major advantage of our approach is the flexibility to 
set the value of η (expected maximum degree of a GD) 
according to the requirements for deploying the network. 
 
Fig. 9.  Number of distinct keys required to support the size of the network 
 
We use distinct group keys for each of the GDs and distinct 
individual keys for each Os. So, in general case, the number of 
distinct keys required for our network depends directly on the 
number of sensors in the whole network (Figure 9). 
 
Fig. 10.  Storage requirement for a GD for storing the keys for various values 
of η 
 
Each group dominator (GD) in the network has to 
remember one group key and all the individual keys of the 
Oss of that particular group. So, the storage requirement for 
each GD in number of bits is, 
                           ( ) kGD ×+= 1ηγ                                      (3) 
and for each Os, 
                                kOs ×= 2γ                                           (4) 
where, η is the number of Oss in that particular group and k is 
the number of bits required for representing the key. As the 
value of η increases, the storage load for a GD increases. 
Hence, the value of η is set according to the requirements or a 
particular situation at hand. So, if initially we have α number 
of GDs and β number of Oss, the network wide storage usage 
 for storing the keys is, ( )( ) ( )kkwidenetwork ××+×+×=Γ − 21 βηα          
                         ( )( )βηα ×++××= 21k                         (5)  
 
 
Fig. 11.  Number of Vertices versus size of the dominating set when expected 
average degree 6 and 12 
 
After formation of clusters within the network, the 
mediators are used for communication among clusters. From 
the higher level view, we could consider the clusters (or 
groups) as nodes in a random graph G=(n, p), where n is the 
number of nodes (i.e. clusters in our case) for which the 
probability that an edge (i. e. communication link via 
mediator) exists between two nodes is p. p=0 when there is no 
edge and p=1 when the graph is fully connected. According to 
Erdös and Rényi [14], for monotone properties, there exists a 
value of p such that the property moves from “nonexistent” to 
“certainly true” in a very large random graph. The function 
defining p is called the threshold function of a property.  
Given a desired probability Pc for graph connectivity, the 
threshold function p is defined by, 
Pc = ∞→nlim Pr[G(n,p) is connected] = 
cee
−
 
where, p = 
n
Pn c ))ln(ln()ln( −−  
Let, p be the probability that an edge (communication link 
via mediator) exists between two GDs of two clusters, n be the 
number of nodes (i.e. clusters/groups in the entire network in 
this case), and d be the expected degree of each GD, then, 
 
                    d = p× (n-1) 
                       = 
n
Pnn c )))ln(ln())(ln(1( −−−                       (6) 
Figure 12 illustrates the plot of the expected degree of a 
node d, as a function of the network size n (i.e. here the 
number of clusters or groups), for various values of Pc. The 
figure shows that the expected degree of a GD needs to be 
increased by two to increase the probability that a random 
graph is connected by one order. Moreover, the curves of the 
plot are almost flat when n is large, indicating that the size of 
the network has insignificant impact on the expected degree of 
a node (here, clusters) required to have a connected graph. 
In our approach, the sensors could be added later on rather 
deploying all of them at a time. Sometimes the entire terrain 
information and deployment diagram could be available 
(consider a battlefield scenario where the sensors are deployed 
prior to the enemy forces’ invasion). In this case, the extra 
sensors could be deployed within the range of its appropriate 
group or cluster. If the sensors are deployed randomly, in the 
worst case, all the extra or newly added sensors will not be 
within the range of their intended group dominator and even 
no other GD could be available in their surroundings. Hence, 
in the worst case, all the newly added sensors would be 
included in the dominating set which would increase the size 
of the dominating set. Still it could be less than the number of 
dominators needed in case of a connected dominating set 
(CDS) when the network size is very large. 
 
Fig. 12. Given a connectivity probability, expected degree of a GD from the 
high level view 
 
Our scheme ensures that, each of the GDs and the 
corresponding Oss could directly form the groups (i. e. 
clusters) maintaining the security of the network from the 
bootstrapping state. As encryption is used for message-
transmission within the network from the very beginning of 
the network formation, our scheme could successfully defend 
Hello Flood Attack [15] and most of other attacks in wireless 
sensor networks [16]. Again, as each node carries distinct 
individual and group keys, compromising one node affects 
only one link in the network while other links remain safe 
from the attacks by the adversaries. If the group key of a 
particular group is compromised, still the adversary needs 
valid individual keys of the Oss for decrypting the information 
 sent from an Os. In case of the compromise of a GD, the base 
station gets involved for revoking the keys and even in this 
case, only one group is affected while others could still 
operate.  
As the group dominators rule over all other sensors in the 
group for data transmission, the dominators could require 
more energy, processing and storage power. For this, a set of 
sensors with greater resources could be considered as 
dominators. In our approach we kept the number of cluster 
heads small; hence, it could reduce the cost in comparison 
with a network which requires a large number of cluster 
heads. To avoid traffic concentration on a few cluster heads, 
the cluster size should be evenly distributed among the cluster 
heads. Our approach could perform well in this case. To 
reduce inter-cluster-head traffic, the number of clusters should 
be controlled and in our scheme, as the number of cluster 
heads is relatively less, the number of clusters is relatively 
less. Keeping the size of the dominating set (i. e. number of 
cluster heads) to a minimum also helps for better security in 
the network because, there is comparatively small number of 
entry-paths (to the base station) for injecting false report by 
the adversaries and each dominator in the set could check the 
validity of the reports sent from the subordinate sensors before 
forwarding those to the base station. For this the GD could set 
a particular value τ, which is the number of sensors in a 
particular group/cluster that should send the same report to the 
GD to convince that the report is true. The GDos that could be 
formed in the network does not have any subordinate sensors, 
hence it could easily carry an extra group key in its memory. 
Basically in that case, only the rank of the Os changes but it 
does not incur any significant load on it.  
Our approach has some limitations. If a sensor network is 
deployed via random scattering (e.g. from an airplane), the 
sensors could be well-scattered even if one group is released 
at a time (the worst case as mentioned earlier) and the nodes 
of the same group could be out of the communication ranges 
of each other after deployment. Even if the nodes are 
deployed by hand, the large number of nodes involved in DSN 
makes it costly to predetermine the location of every 
individual node. The re-keying feature ensures robust security 
as with each addition of a new sensor, the group key is 
renewed but, it could be resource-exhaustive for the resource-
constrained sensors. In such a case, the key renewal 
mechanism could be omitted. However, for military networks 
as security is the major issue, we could consider a slight 
increase of the usage of the resources in the sensors. 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS 
This paper has presented an efficient approach for secure 
clustering in distributed sensor networks based on key-
predistribution and prior rank assignments. We have dealt 
with only the clustering phase of a distributed sensor network. 
There is still a lot of scope to extend the work further. In 
future, we will try to mitigate or remove the limitations of our 
approach and will deal with secure routing and an efficient 
method to prevent Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks in 
distributed sensor networks using our approach. 
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